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2. Korea - North China - Japan

As of 13 December, the strength of Communist forces in Korea and Manchuria was estimated at 1,286,000, of which 381,000 are believed to be in Korea:

Chinese Communist troops in Korea	275,000
North Korean troops in Korea	85,000
Guerrillas in the immediate vicinity	- • •
of UN forces along the 38th	
parallel.	11,000
Guerrillas throughout South Korea	11,000
Chinese Communist Field Forces	_
in Manchuria	350,000
Chinese Communist garrison troops	
in Manchuria	505,000
North Korean troops training or	
staging in Manchuria	50,000

Arrival of additional elements of the Third Field Army and the probable arrival of an army from the North China Military Area account for the increase in Chinese strength over that reported last week (by 25,000 in Korea and by 75,000 in Manchuria).

Although Chinese Communist propaganda implies the intent to drive UN forces from Korea,
a contemplated halt at the 38th parallel, pending the development of negotiations. There has been no firm indication of immediate Chinese plans. In messages from North Korean Supreme Headquarters, North Korean units have been ordered south of the 38th parallel.

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fragmentary communications intelligence indicates considerable increase in Chinese Communist aircraft strength. This includes messages concerning air activity at Kaiyuan and the possible use of as many as 100 aircraft observed on the new Manchurian airground radio net reported last week. US Far East Command now estimates 600 aircraft (including 200 Soviet) available to the enemy in North China and Manchuria (exclusive of Soviet air strength in the Port Arthur-Dairen area). Increased activity by MIG-15 jet fighters over Korea in recent days indicates the arrival of replacements and perhaps some increase in jet strength.

The number of aircraft made available to the North Korean Air Force is not known. Recent North Korean Air Force messages have been concerned with (a) continued pilot training in Manchuria, (b) the availability and movement of aircraft, including fighters, (c) the movement of personnel, including pilots and an engineer unit, to Pyongyang, (d) procurement of personnel, (e) the forward movement of several anti-aircraft regiments, and (f) the completion of airfield construction at Fengcheng, Manchuria. A fragmentary message of 12 December requesting negotiations for air transport of equipment "by the Russian pilots" could be concerned with the above movement to Pyongyang.

Recent North Korean messages, particularly those of the Air Force, tend to clarify the role of Soviet "advisers" with North Korean forces. On 7 December, a message between two advisers mentioned a request by Krasovsky (believed to be the Krasovsky who commands the Soviet Air Forces in the Far East) that "combat be carried on with the fighter planes now available," and a message of 11 December mentioned a movement made "in compliance with the Air Division Senior Adviser and Supreme Commander's order." A message to a North Korean corps implied that a unit's movement would be delayed until its "adviser" arrived. There have been increasing references to these advisers in recent weeks.

Relationship between the North Korean and the Chinese Communist forces (always referred to as "volunteer" in North



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Korean messages) has not been clear. The tenor of messages referring to Chinese units has implied cooperation and coordination, but independent tactical operation. One recent message, however, indicates that some North Korean units may be under the tactical direction of Chinese commanders.

Right North Korean army corps have been identified, three of which are in position to flank the US Eighth Army on the east and cut lines of communication between UN forces and Pusan. Two of the corps are operating in northeastern Korea and the remaining three continue training and organizational activities in Manchuria.

There are continuing reports of defense preparations and the evacuation of industries and stocks from Chinese and Manchurian cities. A Chinese Communist message of 2 December stated that the "Tsingtao petrolsum corporation has sent its fuel oil....away in order to strengthen air defense." A number of unconfirmed reports have related plans to move the capital from Peiping.

A fragmentary Chinese Communist message from Mukden to Dairen indicated an 8 December deadline for the receipt of transport plans for the first quarter of 1951 and apparently concerned meetings designed to "develop the transport capacity of ships."

Chinese fears for the security of their radio communications are indicated by a shipping message from Shanghal to Hankow directing precautions against fictitious messages sent over Communist radio frequencies. A message of 23 September, believed from Chungking, cited the necessity "to preserve state secrets" as one reason for the construction of wire communications.



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